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FUELING THE DEATH SPIRAL FOR WORKERS’ PENSIONS: THE
BANKRUPTCY PROCESS AND MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLANS
COLLEEN RAY *
I.

INTRODUCTION

At this moment, in both the private and public sectors, there is ongoing
fierce debate about the future of employee pension plans. 1 At the core of this
debate is the financial sustainability of traditional defined benefit pension plans:
plans that promise to pay retirement income to pensioners and surviving
spouses for the rest of their lives. 2 Fueling this controversy is the underfunding
of pension plans caused in large measure by the unexpected underperformance
of the investment markets since 2000, punctuated by the investment crash of
2008, and the effects of the lingering Great Recession on employers and
workers. 3 One of the “last bastions” of traditional defined benefit retirement

* Villanova University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2013. The author would like to
dedicate this Comment to the American workers who will suffer as a result of the unfairness
of the current bankruptcy system. The author would like to thank her family without whose
support this Comment would not have been possible.
1. See Hazel Bradford, Public Pension Plans Brace for
Legal Challenges to Cuts, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 3, 2012,
http://www.pionline.com/article/20120903/PRINTSUB/309039973
(discussing
legal
challenges to dramatic pension reforms such as greater employee contributions, higher
retirement ages, or lower pension multipliers in New Jersey, Rhode
Island, Louisiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, and California); see also Michael Corkery,
Pension Crisis Looms Despite Cuts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2012, at A1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443890304578010752828935688.html
(discussing how nearly every state has trimmed pension benefits for public employees).
2. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 229–30 (1986)
(describing difference between “defined benefit plan” and “defined contribution plan” in
multiemployer plan context).
3. See Private Pensions: Long-standing Challenges Remain for Multiemployer Pension
Benefits: Hearing before the Comm. On Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 111th Cong. 1–2
(2010) (statement of Charles A. Jeszeck, Acting Dir., Educ., Workforce, & Income Sec.
Issues) [hereinafter Jeszeck Statement].
Since 2000, many multiemployer plans have experienced significant reductions in
their funded status. Several factors contributed to this underfunding, including
stock market losses, which reduced the value of plans’ holdings, and historically
low interest rates, which increased plan liabilities. The economic downturn also
affected employers’ ability to contribute to these plans. Many companies
experienced slowdowns or closed their doors. While recent reports point to a
recovering economy, some industries in which multiemployer plans are common
have experienced high unemployment, limiting the stream of contributions coming
into the plans.
Id.; see also Frances Denmark, Multiemployer Pension Plans Face Uncertain Future, INST.
INVESTOR (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Article/2442319/AssetManagement-Pensions/Multiemployer-Pension-Plans-Face-Uncertain-Future.html.
A devastating confluence of events—economic, sociological, and regulatory—is
threatening the retirement security of millions of union workers while creating
financial hardship for tens of thousands of employers. Market losses, growing
unemployment, diminished union membership, pension regulation that backfired

(57)
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programs are multiemployer pension plans: plans that are established and
maintained through collective bargaining by labor unions and the employers of
their members in accordance with the Labor Management Relations (TaftHartley) Act. 4
Recognizing the importance of multiemployer pension plans to the
retirement income security of millions of American workers, Congress
developed a comprehensive federal regulatory regime to protect and nurture
these plans. 5 This legislative scheme is reflected in the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and in the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), which amended ERISA. 6 A key element
and rich benefits negotiated in halcyon times are creating a potent mix that is
choking the viability of hundreds of multiemployer plans.
Id.
4. Building a Secure Future for Multiemployer Pension Plans: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Phyllis C.
Borzi, Assistant Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin.) [hereinafter
Borzi Statement] (“Multiemployer defined benefit pension plans play a vital role in providing
retirement security to millions of American workers and retirees.”); Don McIntosh, What Ever
LABOR
PRESS
(June
5,
2009),
Happened
to
Retirement?,
NW.
http://www.nwlaborpress.org/2009/0605/6-5-09GRetire.html (“Unionized employers are
becoming the last bastion of the traditional pension.”); see also Connolly, 475 U.S. at 232
(discussing how multiemployer pension plans are commonly called “Taft-Hartley plans”
because they are products of labor-management collective bargaining).
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(a)–(c) (2006). In pertinent part, ERISA states:
(a) Effects of multiemployer pension plans. The Congress finds that—(1)
multiemployer pension plans have a substantial impact on interstate commerce and
are affected with a national public interest; (2) multiemployer pension plans have
accounted for a substantial portion of the increase in private pension plan coverage
over the past three decades; (3) the continued well-being and security of millions of
employees, retirees, and their dependents are directly affected by multiemployer
pension plans; and (4)(A) withdrawals of contributing employers from a
multiemployer pension plan frequently result in substantially increased funding
obligations for employers who continue to contribute to the plan, adversely
affecting the plan, its participants and beneficiaries, and labor-management
relations, and (B) in a declining industry, the incidence of employer withdrawals is
higher and the adverse effects described in subparagraph (A) are exacerbated.
(b) Modification of multiemployer plan termination insurance provisions and
replacement of program. The Congress further finds that—(1) it is desirable to
modify the current multiemployer plan termination insurance provisions in order to
increase the likelihood of protecting plan participants against benefit losses; and (2)
it is desirable to replace the termination insurance program for multiemployer
pension plans with an insolvency-based benefit protection program that will
enhance the financial soundness of such plans, place primary emphasis on plan
continuation, and contain program costs within reasonable limits.
(c) Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act—(1) to foster and
facilitate interstate commerce, (2) to alleviate certain problems which tend to
discourage the maintenance and growth of multiemployer pension plans, (3) to
provide reasonable protection for the interests of participants and beneficiaries of
financially distressed multiemployer pension plans, and (4) to provide a financially
self-sufficient program for the guarantee of employee benefits under multiemployer
plans.
Id.
6. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–461 (2006) (regulating pension plans); see also John C.
Kilgannon, Navigating Inchoate Withdrawal Liability Pension Fund Claims Through
L.J.
50,
51
(2006),
available
at
Bankruptcy,
19
BENEFITS
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of MPPAA’s design to preserve multiemployer defined benefit pension plans is
employer withdrawal liability (EWL). 7 EWL is a share of the unfunded vested
benefit liabilities that accrued while an employer was obligated to contribute to
the pension plan. 8
ERISA, as amended by MPPAA, requires a multiemployer plan to impose
EWL on an employer that ceases to be obligated to contribute to the plan and
withdraws. 9 EWL was intended to prevent employers from abandoning plans
with unfunded vested benefit liabilities and dumping their share of those
liabilities on remaining employers. 10 Congress envisioned that EWL would
save multiemployer pension plans from being undermined by a “vicious
downward spiral” of cascading withdrawals as employers raced for the exit to
avoid the plan’s liabilities. 11
For the twenty years following the enactment of MPPAA, most
multiemployer pension plans enjoyed a relatively stable situation due to good
investment markets. 12 Recently a “perfect storm” of economic and regulatory

http://www.stevenslee.com/news/Kilgannon_BLJ%20indd.pdf (explaining that MPPAA
amended ERISA to fill void in existing legislation that did not adequately protect
multiemployer pension plans from adverse consequences that arose when employer
terminated its participation in plan).
7. See Jeszeck Statement, supra note 3, at 1–2 (discussing how MPPAA strengthened
funding requirements and made employers liable for their share of unfunded plan benefits
upon withdrawal from multiemployer plan). The MPPAA’s changes were also meant to
discourage withdrawals, which shifts liabilities to PBGC’s insurance program. See id.
8. See id. at 7–8 (explaining how MPPAA made employers liable for their share of
unfunded plan benefits when they withdrew from multiemployer plan and how amount is
based upon proportional share of plan’s unfunded vested benefits).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (2006) (“If an employer withdraws from a multiemployer plan
in a complete withdrawal or a partial withdrawal, then the employer is liable to the plan in the
amount determined under this part to be the withdrawal liability.”).
10. See Jeszeck Statement, supra note 3, at 3–4 (“Liabilities that cannot be collected
from a withdrawing employer, for example, one in bankruptcy, were to be rolled over and
eventually had to be funded by the plan’s remaining employers. The changes were to
discourage withdrawals, which shift liabilities to PBGC’s insurance program.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
11. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 722 n.2 (1984).
Congressional testimony by the Executive Director of the PBGC further explained
the problems caused by employers withdrawing from multiemployer plans: A key
problem of ongoing multiemployer plans, especially in declining industries, is the
problem of employer withdrawal. Employer withdrawals reduce a plan’s
contribution base. This pushes the contribution rate for remaining employers to
higher and higher levels in order to fund past service liabilities, including liabilities
generated by employers no longer participating in the plan, so-called inherited
liabilities. The rising costs may encourage—or force—further withdrawals, thereby
increasing the inherited liabilities to be funded by an ever-decreasing contribution
base. This vicious downward spiral may continue until it is no longer reasonable or
possible for the pension plan to continue.
Id. (quoting Pension Plan Termination Insurance Issues: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 95th Cong. 22 (1978) (statement of Matthew
M. Lind)). For a discussion of pre-MPPAA congressional concerns, see infra notes 51–63
and accompanying text.
12. See Assessing the Challenges Facing Multiemployer Pension Plans: Hearing
before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions of the Comm. on Educ. & the
Workforce, 112th Cong. 2 (2012) (testimony of Josh Shapiro, Deputy Dir. for Research &
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development has endangered multiemployer pension plans, including:
underperforming investment markets beginning in 2000 which reduced the
value of pension plan assets, the declining number of workers represented by
labor unions, new accounting standards for public companies requiring more
financial statement disclosure of multiemployer plan participation, and tougher
funding standards imposed on plans by the Pension Protection Act of 2006
(PPA). 13
However, a more ominous threat to the MPPAA regulatory scheme and the
survival of multiemployer pension plans is the Bankruptcy Code. 14 The
Bankruptcy Code is wreaking havoc on multiemployer pension plans by
providing an escape hatch from employer withdrawal liability, as recently
highlighted by In re Hostess Brands, Inc. 15 By taking advantage of bankruptcy
courts, employers are able to discharge their EWL as a debt and as a result
avoid paying millions or even billions of dollars in EWL to pension plans. 16
Because of the structure of multiemployer pension plans, the diminished pool of
contributing employers remaining in the multiemployer pension plans gets stuck

Educ. Nat’l Coordinating Comm. for Multiemployer Plans) [hereinafter Assessing the
Challenges Facing Multiemployer Pension Plans] (“Since the establishment of ERISA’s prefunding requirements, multiemployer plans have typically been very well funded. This was
especially true in the late 1990’s [sic] when exceptionally strong stock market returns resulted
in many plans having assets that were significantly larger than their liabilities.”).
13. See Jeszeck Statement, supra note 3, at 1–2 (enumerating factors contributing to
multiemployer plans’ funding reduction); see also Denmark, supra note 3 (discussing various
factors lending to deterioration of multiemployer pension plans); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-79, PRIVATE PENSIONS: CHANGES NEEDED TO BETTER
PROTECT MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION BENEFITS 6 (2010).
The funding requirements of PPA took effect just as the nation entered a severe
economic recession in December 2007. As a result, Congress enacted the Worker,
Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act of 2008 (WRERA) to provide multiemployer
plans with temporary relief from some PPA requirements by allowing
multiemployer plans to temporarily freeze their funded status at the previous year’s
level. The freeze allows plans to delay creation of, or updates to, an existing
funding improvement plan or rehabilitation plan, or postpone other steps required
under PPA.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
14. See Kilgannon, supra note 6, at 51.
The divergent case law is the product of an apparent conflict between the
provisions of MPPAA and the Bankruptcy Code. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code
contemplates the discharge of contingent and unmatured claims; MPPAA provides
that a withdrawal liability claim does not ripen unless and until the employer
withdraws from the fund.
Id.; see also Brief & Memorandum of Law for Nat’l Coordinating Comm. for Multiemployer
Plans as Amicus Curiae Supporting Multiemployer Pension Plans’ Objections to the Debtor’s
Section 1113 Mot. at 2, In re Hostess Brands, Inc., et al., 477 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2012) (No. 12-22052) [hereinafter NCCMP Brief] (“The evasion by some employers through
the bankruptcy process of their withdrawal liability constitutes a persistent and serious
problem for multiemployer plans.”).
15. 477 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection); see also NCCMP Brief, supra note 14, at 3 (stating that use of bankruptcy process
allows employers to evade paying withdrawal liability).
16. For a discussion of corporate use of bankruptcy courts to avoid EWL, see infra
notes 95–134 and accompanying text.
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with the burden of picking up the costs associated with the withdrawal. 17
These increased costs can force other participating employers into insolvency
and cause them to discharge their EWL in bankruptcy, sparking a cascade of
bankruptcies. 18
The loss of contributions and EWL from withdrawn bankrupt employers
can eventually undermine the solvency of the multiemployer pension plan
itself. 19 Once insolvent, a pension plan must cut benefits to the level
guaranteed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a federal
agency funded only by premiums from pension plans. 20 The PBGC provides
funding needed to maintain pensions at the guaranteed level. 21 However, the
PBGC itself may be driven into insolvency if even one large multiemployer
pension plan becomes insolvent and needs PBGC funding. 22
17. See Building a Secure Future for Multiemployer Pension Plans: Hearing Before
the Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Thomas
C. Nyhan, Exec. Dir. and Gen. Counsel of the Teamsters Cent. States Se. and Sw. Areas
Pension Fund) [hereinafter Nyhan Statement] (“When a company in a multiemployer plan
goes out of business without paying its share of the liabilities, it is the surviving employers in
the multiemployer plan that assume the liabilities.”).
18. See id. (asserting that surviving employers in multiemployer pension plans cannot
continue assuming liabilities of companies that go out of business because “increased
contributions are forcing more and more of these employers out of business”).
19. See NCCMP Brief, supra note 14, at 4. The NCCMP Brief stated:
In the event that the downward spiral . . . is permitted to continue, there is a real
and present risk that the multiemployer plans will fail. In that event, the burden of
providing the promised benefits, albeit at a substantial reduction to the detriment of
the plan participants and their beneficiaries, will fall to the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”), whose role is statutorily circumscribed and which
itself is not sufficiently funded to carry that burden. Ultimately, then, it is the plan
participants and their beneficiaries who will suffer the loss of anticipated and
necessary retirement income.
Id.
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 1426 (2006) (setting maximum guaranteed level for which PGBC
will insure retiree benefits when multiemployer pension plan is insolvent and explaining how
insolvency status for plan year is determined).
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 1431 (2006) (explaining that if multiemployer pension plan applies
for financial assistance, and PGBC verifies that plan is or will be insolvent, PGBC will
provide financial assistance in amount sufficient to enable plan to pay basic benefits).
22. See PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 2011 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT iv (2011),
available at http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2011-annual-report.pdf. The PBGC Annual
Report stated:
More than 10 million of America’s workers and retirees participate in and rely on
multiemployer plans. For decades, multiemployer plans were in relatively good
health, even in the face of industry decline. Unfortunately, for many multiemployer
plans, that is no longer true. Many are substantially underfunded; for some, the
traditional remedies of increasing funding or reducing future benefit accruals won’t
be enough. PBGC’s multiemployer pension insurance works very differently from
our single-employer program. PBGC has fewer tools to work with multiemployer
plans, and we cannot step in until plans are already insolvent, by which time other
remedies are no longer possible. In the past year, as a result of additional failures,
the financial deficit of our multiemployer program increased sharply, from $1.4
billion last year to $2.8 billion as of September 30, 2011. The greater challenge,
however, comes from those plans that have not yet failed: our estimate of our
reasonably possible obligations (obligations to participants), described in our
financial statements, increased to $23 billion.
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This comment examines how the Bankruptcy Code undermines the
retirement security goals of ERISA and MPPAA. First, Part II traces the
development of multiemployer pension plans and the regulatory scheme. 23
Next, Part III discusses how withdrawal liability functions and how employer
withdrawals affect the other employers contributing to a multiemployer pension
plan. 24 Part IV addresses the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of withdrawal
liability. 25 Finally, Part V analyzes the impact of discharging withdrawal
liability by discussing In re Hostess Brands, Inc. 26
II. THE NATURE AND REGULATION OF MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLANS
A. The Nature of Multiemployer Plans
A multiemployer pension plan is a pooled trust into which multiple
employers, usually within a single type of industry, are required to contribute in
order to fund their employees’ pensions upon retirement. 27 The amount that
employers are required to contribute generally depends on the collective
bargaining agreement they negotiated with the labor union or unions
representing their employees. 28 The employers’ contributions are typically
The
dollars—or cents—per unit of time that an employee works. 29
contributions are paid periodically by the employers to the pension plan trust
and then are pooled. 30 After working for a certain length of time, an employee
Id.; see also NCCMP Brief, supra note 14, at 4 (describing negative impact of requiring other
employers in MEPP to assume withdrawal liability of insolvent employer).
23. For a discussion of the development of ERISA and MPPAA, see infra notes 27–62
and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of employment withdrawal liability, see infra notes 63–91 and
accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of withdrawal liability in bankruptcy proceedings, see infra notes
92–132 and accompanying text.
26. For an analysis of Hostess and discussion of the ramifications of discharging
employer withdrawal liability, see infra notes 133–80 and accompanying text.
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37)(A) (2006) (stating that multiemployer plans are plans “to
which more than one employer is required to contribute . . . which is maintained pursuant to
one or more collective bargaining agreements between one or more employee organizations
and more than one employer”); see also Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr.
Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 605 (1993) (explaining that multiemployer
pension plans involve more than one employer contributing, and contributions made by
participating employers are pooled into general funds available to pay any benefit obligation
of plan); Nyhan Statement, supra note 17, at 2 (“Multiemployer pension plans are collectively
bargained, jointly administered pension plans funded by a number of contributing employers
that are often in the same industry.”).
28. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 217 (1986).
The Trust receives contributions from several thousand employers under written
collective-bargaining agreements covering employees . . . [u]nder these collectivebargaining agreements, the employers agree to contribute a certain amount to the
Pension Plan, with the actual amount contributed by each employer determined by
multiplying their employees’ hours of service by a rate specified in the current
agreement.
Id.
29. See id.
30. See Concrete Pipe & Prods., 508 U.S. at 605 (explaining how contributions made
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obtains a vested right to secure benefits upon retirement. 31
Approximately ten million workers are covered by 1,400 multiemployer
plans. 32 Industries where workers are typically covered by multiemployer
pension plans include: construction, retail, food, garment manufacturing,
mining, and trucking. 33 An important aspect of multiemployer pension plans is
the portability of benefits, which enables employees to move easily between
employers contributing to the same plan while continuing to accrue pension
benefits. 34
Multiemployer pension plans are important because they provide a private
source of economic security to the nation’s workers. 35 They are also beneficial
because they provide retirement benefits in industries where it is unlikely that
individual employers would establish single employer pension plans. 36
Multiemployer pension plans also help to ensure that the employers
participating in the plans have access to a trained labor force. 37 As Congress
by participating employers are pooled in general fund available to pay any benefit obligation
of plan).
31. See id. at 606 (explaining how employees obtain vested rights to secure benefits
upon retirement).
32. See Jeszeck Statement, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that in 2009 there were about
1,500 multiemployer plans that covered more than 10.4 million workers and retirees).
33. See id. (noting multiemployer plans cover workers in trucking, retail, food,
construction, mining, and garment industries).
34. See Concrete Pipe & Prods., 508 U.S. at 605–06 (“To receive benefits, an
employee participating in such a plan need not work for one employer for any particular
continuous period. Because service credit is portable, employees of an employer participating
in the plan may receive such credit for any work done for any participating employer.”); see
also Jeszeck Statement, supra note 3, at 1 (explaining that multiemployer pension plans
provide portability of benefits because “[w]orkers can continue accruing pension benefits
when they change jobs if their new employer is contributing employer in same plan”). This is
particularly important to workers in industries like construction, where job changes are
frequent throughout employees’ careers. See id.
35. See NCCMP Brief, supra note 14, at 4–5 (explaining public interest served by
multiemployer pension plans). For a discussion of congressional findings regarding the
importance of multiemployer pension plans, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
36. See Concrete Pipe & Prods., 508 U.S. at 606.
Multiemployer plans like the one before us have features that are beneficial in
industries where ‘there [is] little if any likelihood that individual employers would
or could establish single-employer plans for their employees . . . [,] where there are
hundreds and perhaps thousands of small employers, with countless numbers of
employers going in and out of business each year, [and where] the nexus of
employment has focused on the relationship of the workers to the union to which
they belong, and/or the industry in which they are employed, rather than to any
particular employer.’
Id. (quoting Multiemployer Pension Plan Termination Insurance Program: Hearings Before
the S. Comm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong. 50 (1979)
(statement of Robert A. Georgine, Chairman, Nat’l Coordinating Comm. for Multiemployer
Plans)).
37. See Concrete Pipe & Prods., 508 U.S. at 606–07.
Multiemployer plans provide the participating employers with such labor market
benefits as the opportunity to offer a pension program (a significant part of the
covered employees’ compensation package) with cost and risk-sharing mechanisms
advantageous to the employer. The plans, in consequence, help ensure that each
participating employer will have access to a trained labor force whose members are
able to move from one employer and one job to another without losing service
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has stated, multiemployer pension plans are of national public interest and are
vital to the security of millions of employees, retirees, and their dependents. 38
B. The Federal Regulation of Multiemployer Pension Plans
Multiemployer pension plans have been in use since the 1940s. 39 At first,
they were established and controlled solely by the unions. 40 However, spurred
by the realization of the importance of these plans and concerned with the
improper administration of the plans, Congress began regulating them in
1947. 41
1.

Taft-Hartley Act

Congress’s first attempt at regulating multiemployer pension plans was
through the Taft-Harley Act. 42 The Taft-Hartley Act dictates the structure of
multiemployer pension plans. 43 It requires that plans be maintained as trusts
with an equal number of labor and management trustees administering the
plans, and it also requires that the plans be maintained for the exclusive benefit
of the employees of contributing employers. 44
2.

ERISA

In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA, a “comprehensive and reticulated
statute.” 45 The purpose of ERISA was to provide a uniform federal regulatory
system over employee benefit plans in order to secure workers’ pension
benefits. 46 Congress recognized the societal importance of employer-sponsored
credit toward pension benefits.
Id.
38. For a discussion of congressional findings regarding the importance of
multiemployer pension plans, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
39. See Daniel A. Etna, MPPAA Withdrawal Liability Assessment: Letting the Fox
Guard the Henhouse, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 211, 216–17 (discussing history of
multiemployer pension plans in United States and how Taft-Hartley Act furnished flexible
framework for participants in labor relations field to administer pension plans).
40. See id. at 216 (explaining beginning of multiemployer pension plans).
41. See id. at 217 (discussing Taft-Hartley Act and how there was concern over abuse
and improper administration of pension plans).
42. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–87 (2006) (regulating multiemployer pension plans).
43. See Etna, supra note 39, at 217 (discussing history of multiemployer pension plans
in United States and its interaction with Taft-Hartley Act).
44. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (2006) (stating that board of trustees is comprised of
one-half employer appointees and one-half union appointees); see also Nat’l Labor Relations
Bd. v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) (“Congress directed that union welfare funds
be established as written formal trusts, and that the assets of the funds be ‘held in trust,’ and
be administered ‘for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees . . . and their families and
dependents . . . .’”).
45. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)
(discussing development of ERISA).
46. See AETNA Health Inc. v. Juan Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (“Congress
enacted ERISA to ‘protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries’ by setting out substantive regulatory requirements for employee benefit plans
and to ‘provid[e] for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
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retirement plans and wanted to guarantee that “if a worker has been promised a
defined pension benefit upon retirement—and if he has fulfilled whatever
conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit—he actually will receive
it.” 47 Multiemployer pension plans are among the retirement plans subjected to
ERISA’s comprehensive regulatory scheme, including: reporting and disclosure
requirements; minimum standards for participation, vesting, benefit accrual, and
funding; standards of fiduciary conduct; and enforcement provisions. 48
ERISA also established the PBGC, a federal government agency which
insures against pension plan terminations, and directed it to create a pension
benefit guaranty program for multiemployer pension plans that would be
separate from the guaranty program for single employer pension plans. 49 The
payment of guaranteed benefits by the PBGC for multiemployer pension plans
was to become mandatory on January 1, 1978. 50 During the intervening period,
Congress became concerned with the number of plans that were experiencing
extreme financial hardship. 51 Congress directed the PGBC to analyze the
problems faced by multiemployer pension plans and recommend legislation to
help correct the problems. 52
courts.’”) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray
& Co., 467 U.S. 717, 720 (1984) (“Among the principal purposes of this ‘comprehensive and
reticulated statute’ was to ensure that employees and their beneficiaries would not be deprived
of anticipated retirement benefits by the termination of pension plans before sufficient funds
have been accumulated in the plans.”).
47. Nachman Corp., 446 U.S. at 375 (explaining why Congress enacted ERISA).
48. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–461 (2006) (establishing regulations for pension plans); see
also Trs. of Amalgamated Ins. Fund v. McFarlin’s Inc., 789 F.2d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1986)
(“ERISA regulated the funding, management, operation and benefit provisions of private
pension plans and established a program to insure employee benefits in the event of plan
termination.”).
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006) (creating Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation); see
also R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. at 720.
Title IV of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq., created a plan termination insurance
program, administered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”), a
wholly owned Government corporation within the Department of Labor, § 1302.
The PBGC collects insurance premiums from covered pension plans and provides
benefits to participants in those plans if their plan terminates with insufficient assets
to support its guaranteed benefits. For pension plans maintained by single
employers, the PBGC’s obligation to pay benefits took effect immediately upon
enactment of ERISA in 1974. For multiemployer pension plans, however, the
payment of guaranteed benefits by the PBGC was not to become mandatory until
January 1, 1978.
Id.; Jeszeck Statement, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that Title IV of ERISA created PBGC, which
operates two distinct pension insurance programs, one for multiemployer plans and one for
single employer plans).
50. See R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. at 720 (explaining development of ERISA and role
of PGBC).
51. See id. at 721 (“As the date for mandatory coverage of multiemployer pension
plans approached, Congress became concerned that a significant number of plans were
experiencing extreme financial hardship. This, in turn, could have resulted in the termination
of numerous plans, forcing the PBGC to assume obligations in excess of its capacity.”).
52. See S. Rep. No. 95-570, at 1–4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4128,
4128–131 (directing PBGC to analyze problems faced by multiemployer plans and
recommend legislative action); see also R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. at 730 (“One of the
primary problems Congress identified under ERISA was that the statute encouraged employer
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The PBGC’s key finding was that multiemployer pension plans were not
sufficiently protected by ERISA due to employer withdrawals from plans. 53
ERISA allowed employers to withdraw from pension plans without paying for
the benefits earned by their employees. 54 The PBGC found that employer
withdrawals reduced the amount of contributions to the pension plans and
forced other participating employers to pay higher contributions to cover the
costs of the plans, including debts owed by employers who no longer
participated in the plans. 55 Calling it a “vicious downward spiral,” the PBGC
explained that as a result of the rising costs, other employers would be
encouraged to withdraw until eventually the plan would no longer be
sustainable. 56
To counteract this problem, the PBGC suggested that the withdrawing
employer be required to pay part of the plan’s unfunded vested liabilities that
accumulated during the employer’s participation in the plan. 57 The PBGC
thought the penalty of withdrawal liability would discourage withdrawals and

withdrawals from multiemployer plans.”).
53. See R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. at 722.
The basic problem with the withdrawal rules is that they are designed primarily to
protect PBGC. They do not provide an efficient mechanism for reducing the
burden of withdrawal on the plan and remaining employers. They may even
encourage withdrawals in some instances (e.g., where termination may be
imminent). Changes in the withdrawal rules should be considered: (1) to provide
relief to plans without increasing the burden on the insurance system, (2) to provide
a disincentive to voluntary employer withdrawals, (3) to reduce or remove
disincentives to plan entry, and (4) to work with, instead of against, the termination
liability provisions.
Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 95-214, 91 Stat. 1501 (1977)) (internal citations omitted).
54. See Trs. of Amalgamated Ins. Fund v. McFarlin’s, Inc., 789 F.2d 98, 102 (2d Cir.
1986) (explaining how ERISA’s original structure allowed employers to withdraw from
multiemployer pension plans without incurring withdrawal liability). This original structure
left the plan’s remaining contributing employers to pay for benefits promised to, and earned
by, withdrawing employers’ employees. See id.
55. See R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. at 722 n.2.
Congressional testimony by the Executive Director of the PBGC further explained
the problems caused by employers withdrawing from multiemployer plans: ‘A key
problem of ongoing multiemployer plans, especially in declining industries, is the
problem of employer withdrawal. Employer withdrawals reduce a plan’s
contribution base. This pushes the contribution rate for remaining employers to
higher and higher levels in order to fund past service liabilities, including liabilities
generated by employers no longer participating in the plan, so-called inherited
liabilities. The rising costs may encourage—or force—further withdrawals, thereby
increasing the inherited liabilities to be funded by an ever-decreasing contribution
base. This vicious downward spiral may continue until it is no longer reasonable or
possible for the pension plan to continue.’
Id. (quoting Pension Plan Termination Insurance Issues: Hearings before the S. Comm. on
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 95th Cong. 22 (1978) (statement of Matthew
M. Lind)).
56. See id. (describing domino effect of employer withdrawals).
57. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 216 (1986) (“To
alleviate the problem of employer withdrawals, the PBGC suggested new rules under which a
withdrawing employer would be required to pay whatever share of the plan’s unfunded
liabilities was attributable to that employer’s participation.”) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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lessen the financial impact on the plan in the event the employer did
withdraw. 58
3.

MPPAA

To prevent the “vicious downward spiral,” Congress followed the PBGC’s
recommendation and enacted the MPPAA in 1980. 59 The MPPAA’s purpose
was to provide a special regulatory scheme under ERISA that further protected
and encouraged these plans. 60 The MPPAA overhauled the original ERISA
provisions regarding the multiemployer plan guaranty program to provide some
benefit protections in the event of plan insolvency. 61 Importantly, among
MPPAA’s provisions was EWL, which regulates employer withdrawals from
multiemployer pension plans. 62
III. EMPLOYEE WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY
Perhaps the most notable feature of the MPPAA is EWL, which “requires a

58. See R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. at 723 n.3 (1984).
Again, the PBGC’s Executive Director provided a more elaborate explanation: ‘To
deal with this problem, our report considers an approach under which an employer
withdrawing from a multiemployer plan would be required to complete funding its
fair share of the plan’s unfunded liabilities. In other words, the plan would have a
claim against the employer for the inherited liabilities which would otherwise fall
upon the remaining employers as a result of the withdrawal . . . . We think that
such withdrawal liability would, first of all, discourage voluntary withdrawals and
curtail the current incentives to flee the plan. Where such withdrawals nonetheless
occur, we think that withdrawal liability would cushion the financial impact on the
plan.’
Id. (quoting Pension Plan Termination Insurance Issues: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 95th Cong. 22 (1978) (statement of Matthew
M. Lind).
59. See id. at 722 n.2 (discussing “vicious downward spiral” resulting from employer
withdrawals); see also id. at 723–25 (tracing PBGC’s withdrawal liability proposal from time
it was included in policy recommendations submitted to Congress on February 27, 1979
through September 26, 1980 creation of MPPAA).
60. See Jeszeck Statement, supra note 3, at 3.
In 1980, Congress sought to protect worker pensions in multiemployer plans by
enacting the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (“MPPAA”). Among
other things, MPPAA (1) strengthened funding requirements to help ensure that
plans accumulate enough assets to pay for promised benefits, and (2) made
employers, unless relieved by special provisions, liable for their share of unfunded
plan benefits when they withdrew from a multiemployer plan.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also NCCMP Brief, supra note 14, at 4–5 (“Congress enacted the
MPPAA to protect multiemployer pension plans because those plans serve important
functions in the national economy and as a private source of economic security to the nation’s
workers.”). For a discussion of the importance of multiemployer pension plans to society, see
supra note 5 and accompanying text.
61. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(b) (2006). For the full text of 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(b), see
supra note 5.
62. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S.
Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 609 (1993) (explaining that under MPPAA provisions, employers who
withdraw from multiemployer pension plans incur withdrawal liability, which is fixed and
certain debt to pension plan).
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withdrawing employer to compensate a pension plan for benefits that have
already vested with the employees at the time of the employer’s withdrawal.” 63
EWL was meant to correct the problem of employers terminating participation
in multiemployer pension plans and leaving behind unfunded pension liabilities
for their employees. 64 The unfunded pension liabilities left behind by
employers withdrawing from the plan is borne by employers remaining in the
plan. 65 Until the EWL scheme was put in place, there was an incentive for an
employer to “rush to the exit” to avoid being the last man standing to pay the
unfunded liabilities. 66
A complete withdrawal from a multiemployer pension plan occurs when
there is either a permanent termination of an employer’s obligation to contribute
to the pension plan, or the employer permanently ceases all covered operations
under the plan. 67 An employer’s partial withdrawal can also trigger EWL. 68 A
partial withdrawal occurs in one of three circumstances: (1) when an employer
is no long obligated to contribute, (2) when there has been a severe shrinkage
amounting to a seventy percent contribution decline, or (3) when there has been
a cessation of an obligation to contribute to a facility. 69 There are special
withdrawal liability rules that apply for certain industries, such as
construction. 70
Under the MPPAA, employers withdrawing from multiemployer pension
plans owe a fixed amount of debt to the pension plan. 71 A withdrawing
employer from an underfunded multiemployer pension plan is liable for a

63. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 734 (1984); see
also Judith F. Mazo & Susan Lee, Multiemployer Pension Plan Withdrawal Liability, 23
BENEFITS L.J. 36, 36 (2010), available at http://www.ifebp.org/inforequest/0159257.pdf
(noting that employer withdrawal liability “was the most visible and controversial feature of
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980”).
64. See Jeszeck Statement, supra note 3, at 3–4 (“Liabilities that cannot be collected
from a withdrawing employer, for example, one in bankruptcy, were to be ‘rolled over’ and
eventually had to be funded by the plan’s remaining employers. The changes were to
discourage withdrawals, which shift liabilities to PBGC’s insurance program.”) (footnote
omitted).
65. See id. (“Liabilities that cannot be collected from a withdrawing employer, for
example, one in bankruptcy, were to be ‘rolled over’ and eventually had to be funded by the
plan’s remaining employers.”) (footnote omitted).
66. For a discussion of the pre-MPPAA concerns regarding the vicious downward
spiral that led to the creation of EWL, see supra notes 51–62 and accompanying text.
67. See 29 U.S.C. § 1383 (2006) (defining what constitutes complete employer
withdrawal); see also Kilgannon, supra note 6, at 51 (explaining what constitutes complete
withdrawal); Mazo & Lee, supra note 63, at 40 (explaining that withdrawal is not triggered by
employer’s change in identity due to merger or change in structure of business so long as
obligation to contribute continues).
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006) (defining partial withdrawals from pension plans); see
also Mazo & Lee, supra note 63, at 44 (explaining that employers can be liable for EWL
because of partial withdrawal and discussing what can trigger partial withdrawal).
69. See Mazo & Lee, supra note 63, at 44 (discussing what triggers partial withdrawal).
70. See id. at 37 (describing special withdrawal liability rules that apply to
construction, entertainment, trucking, moving, and warehousing industries).
71. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 725 (1984)
(explaining that MPPAA “requires that an employer withdrawing from a multiemployer
pension plans pay a fixed and certain debt to the pension plan.”).
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proportionate share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits. 72 The unfunded
vested benefits are “the difference between the present value of vested benefits
(benefits that are currently being paid to retirees and that will be paid in the
future to covered employees who have already completed some specified period
of service) and the current value of the plan’s assets.” 73
The EWL represents a withdrawing employer’s accelerated contribution of
the funds needed to pay their employees’ pension benefits which have vested
before the employer withdraws from the multiemployer pension plan, but which
have not been funded at that date. 74 Every year, the multiemployer pension
plan’s unfunded vested liabilities are divided among the employers that were
participating in the plan and required to contribute that year. 75 This allocation
is based upon what the employer was obligated to pay over the preceding five
years. 76 Additionally, any unpaid liability from withdrawn employers that is
deemed uncollectible in a year is allocated among the participating employers
that year. 77 When an employer withdraws from a plan, in addition to the
employer being liable for the EWL, all other “trades and businesses” under
common control with the withdrawn employer are also liable even if they did
not contribute to the plan. 78
72. See id. (“This withdrawal liability is the employer’s proportionate share of the
plan’s ‘unfunded vested benefits,’ calculated as the difference between the present value of
vested benefits and the current value of the plan’s assets.”) (citations omitted).
73. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal.,
508 U.S. 602, 609 (1993) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. See Trs. of Amalgamated Ins. Fund v. McFarlin’s Inc., 789 F.2d 98, 103 (2d Cir.
1986) (explaining how withdrawal liability is calculated under MPPAA).
75. See Mazo & Lee, supra note 63, at 41 (explaining that change in plan’s unfunded
vested liabilities, whether up or down, is allocated each year to employers that were required
to contribute that year).
76. See id. (noting that amount allocated to each employer is based on what they were
obligated to pay into plan over preceding five years).
77. See id. (explaining that every year, multiemployer pension plan trustees determine
amount of liability assessed to previously withdrawn employers that is uncollectible and that
amount is also allocated among the contributing employers). When the employer withdraws,
the amount of its liability is sum of what remains of annual allocations determined by trustees.
See id.
78. See 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) (2006) (“For purposes of this subchapter, under
regulations prescribed by the corporation, all employees of trades or businesses (whether or
not incorporated) which are under common control shall be treated as employed by a single
employer and all such trades and businesses as a single employer.”); see also Cent. States, Se.
& Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. SCOFBP, LLC, 668 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 2688 (2012) (“Under the MPPAA, all trades or businesses under common control
are treated as constituting a single employer for purposes of determining withdrawal liability.
Each trade or business under common control is jointly and severally liable for any
withdrawal liability of any other.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
David R. Levin, Bankruptcy and Employee Benefit Plans—ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code,
14 (1998), available at Westlaw N98EBAB ABA-LGLED N-1.
Even though a debtor’s withdrawal liability may be limited by bankruptcy
proceedings, the debtor’s bankruptcy does not impair the multiemployer plan’s
right to hold members of the debtor’s controlled group jointly and severally liable
for the full amount of the employer’s withdrawal liability. Once it has been
determined that the debtor is part of a controlled group, a copy of the notice and
demand for withdrawal liability should be sent by certified mail, return receipt
requested, to the members of the controlled group that have not sought relief under
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Termination of a multiemployer pension plan can occur either by amending
the plan to “freeze” it or by mass withdrawal of contributing employers. 79
When a plan is frozen, it causes a cessation of the accrual of benefits and any
further vesting. 80 However, the employers remain obligated to contribute to the
plan at a rate sufficient to meet the funding requirements for the plan and the
plan continues to pay out frozen benefits. 81 In the event of a mass employer
withdrawal, each employer is required to pay a withdrawal liability. 82 Special
provisions ensure that the amount of each employer’s liability adds up to the
plan’s total unfunded liability for vested benefits. 83
There are also special rules for insolvent and bankrupt employers. 84 When
Congress created the MPPAA, it tried to strike a balance among the interests of
debtors, creditors, and pension plans. 85 As a result, there is a limitation on the
EWL assessed to insolvent employers undergoing liquidation or dissolution. 86
When an employer is insolvent or dissolving, half of the EWL is contingent on
whether the employer has enough money left to pay the plan after they have
liquidated their assets and paid their other debts. 87 When this happens, there is
an increase in the unfunded pension liabilities in those pension funds to which
the employer was obligated to contribute. 88
Congress anticipated that insolvent employers would cause an increase in
the unfunded pension liabilities; therefore it instructed the PBGC to establish a
voluntary program to reimburse multiemployer plans for EWL that becomes
the Bankruptcy Code.
Id.
79. See Mazo & Lee, supra note 63, at 46 (discussing how multiemployer pension
plans are terminated and how MPPAA redefined concept of “termination” for multiemployer
pension plans).
80. See id. (explaining that termination of multiemployer pension plans is
accomplished by freezing plans, which ceases accrual of benefits and any further vesting, as
opposed to PBGC taking control of plan).
81. See id. (discussing what happens to terminated multiemployer pension plans once
frozen).
82. See id. at 47 (explaining that mass withdrawal, which is presumed to occur when
all employers withdraw within three years, triggers withdrawal liability).
83. See id. (describing how special provisions ensure that amount of liability each
withdrawing employer is required to pay equals plan’s total unfunded liability for vested
benefits).
84. See id. at 40 (explaining how insolvency liquidations impact withdrawal liability).
85. See 29 U.S.C. § 1405(a) (2006) (setting limitation on withdrawal liability for
insolvent employers that are liquidating); see also Trs. of Amalgamated Insurance Fund v.
McFarlin’s Inc., 789 F.2d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Congress simply recognized that in certain
limited circumstances the interests of the withdrawing employer outweighed those of the
employees whose benefits were at stake and of other employers in the Plan who would be
required partially to fund the shortfall resulting from the withdrawal.”).
86. See 29 U.S.C. § 1405(b) (2006) (setting unfunded vested benefits allocable to
insolvent employer undergoing liquidation or dissolution); see also McFarlin’s, 789 F.2d at
105 (explaining 29 U.S.C. § 1405).
87. See Mazo & Lee, supra note 63, at 40 (noting how employers that are insolvent or
going through dissolution have their EWL assessed).
88. See id. at 46 (explaining how multiemployer pension plan trustees determine
amount of liability assessed to previously withdrawn employers that is uncollectible and how
amount allocates among contributing employers). When an employer withdraws, its liability
is the sum of what remains of the annual allocations determined by trustees. See id.
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uncollectible due to proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code or similar
proceedings. 89 However, the PBGC never established the program. 90 As a
result, when previously assessed EWL is deemed uncollectible, instead of the
PBGC reimbursing the plan, the unaccounted-for liability is divided among the
remaining diminished pool of contributing employers to the plan. 91
IV. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE’S TREATMENT OF EMPLOYER
WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY
Independent of MPPAA developments, during the 1980s, employers were
exploring whether reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code could be used to
escape collective bargaining agreements with their employees’ unions and the
employee benefit obligations imposed by those agreements. 92 The U.S.
Supreme Court in National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco 93
addressed this intersection between the Bankruptcy Code and the National
89. See 29 U.S.C. § 1402 (2006).
Required supplemental program to reimburse for payments due from employers
uncollectible as a result of employer involvement in bankruptcy case or
proceedings; program participation, premiums, etc. By May 1, 1982, the
corporation shall establish by regulation a supplemental program to reimburse
multiemployer plans for withdrawal liability payments which are due from
employers and which are determined to be uncollectible for reasons arising out of
cases or proceedings involving the employers under Title 11, or similar cases or
proceedings. Participation in the supplemental program shall be on a voluntary
basis, and a plan that elects coverage under the program shall pay premiums to the
corporation in accordance with a premium schedule, which shall be prescribed from
time to time by the corporation. The premium schedule shall contain such rates and
bases for the application of such rates as the corporation considers to be
appropriate.
Id.
90. See DANA M. MUIR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 1483 (2d ed. 2010) (“Section 4222
provides for the establishment of a supplemental insurance program, funded from voluntary
premium payments by multiemployer plans, designed to reimburse participating plans for
withdrawal liability assessments that become uncollectible as a result of an employer’s filing
for bankruptcy. The PBGC never established the program.”) (footnote omitted); see also
McFarlin’s, 789 F.2d at 105.
As a further step toward assisting the funds in such circumstances, 29 U.S.C. §
1402(a), (b), requires the government to establish a program under which
Multiemployer Pension and Employee Benefit Plans will be reimbursed for
withdrawal liability payments that are uncollectible because the withdrawing
employer has undergone Chapter 11 or similar proceedings.
Id.
91. See Mazo & Lee, supra note 63, at 41 (explaining that every year multiemployer
pension plan trustees determine amount of liability assessed to previously withdrawn
employers that is uncollectible, and that amount is also allocated among contributing
employers).
92. See Babette A. Ceccotti, Lost in Transformation: The Disappearance of Labor
Policies in Applying Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415,
415 (2007) (discussing how recently there has been “resurgence in corporate bankruptcies
targeting labor costs, pension funding and retiree health benefits obligations[, which] recalls
an earlier time when companies saw bankruptcy as a potent instrument in labor-management
relations. In the early 1980’s, the strategic use of bankruptcy in several high-profile labor
disputes . . . .”).
93. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
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Labor Relations Act, governing labor-management collective bargaining. 94
The Court held that a debtor company undergoing reorganization under the
Bankruptcy Code could unilaterally reject a collective bargaining agreement,
like any other executory contract, if the debtor could show that “the collective
bargaining agreement is burdensome to the estate,” and that “the equities
balance in favor of rejection.” 95 The Bildisco decision paved the way for even
solvent companies to manipulate the Bankruptcy Code and unilaterally abrogate
their labor contracts for any reason. 96
Distressed by the imbalance struck by Bildisco against collective
bargaining, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1984 to add Section
1113, which imposes restrictions on the rejection of labor contracts. 97 Section
1113 sets forth a process through which employers must negotiate with labor
unions to reach a resolution before a bankruptcy court can approve rejecting the
labor contracts. 98 The addition of Section 1113 reflects the congressional view
that labor agreements should receive special protections in bankruptcy
proceedings that are not extended to other types of executor contracts. 99
94. See id. at 521 (examining Bankruptcy Code and considering whether employers
can unilaterally reject collective bargaining agreements).
95. Id. (holding that debtor companies can unilaterally reject collective bargaining
agreements).
96. See Nicholas J. Brannick, At the Crossroads of Three Codes: How Employers Are
Using ERISA, the Tax Code, and Bankruptcy to Evade Their Pension Obligations, 65 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1577, 1582–83 (2004) (“The Bildisco decision opened the doors to employers seeking
to reject their labor contracts when those contracts became too burdensome, or simply
inconvenient, by obtaining relief in bankruptcy, even when the employer was not insolvent.”);
see also Ceccotti, supra note 92, at 415–16 (“In the early 1980’s the strategic use of
bankruptcy in several high profile labor disputes, fueled by the Supreme Court’s 1984
decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, unleashed a storm of protests that companies were
abusing the bankruptcy process to target collective bargaining agreements.”) (footnotes
omitted).
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2006) (restricting when a debtor in possession may reject
collective bargaining agreements); see also Ceccotti, supra note 92, at 420 (“Enacted in 1984
as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeships Act, section 1113 was
intended to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Bildisco with respect to the
treatment of collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy.”) (footnote omitted); Ceccotti,
supra note 92, at 415–16 (“Soon after the Bildisco decision, Congress enacted section 1113 of
the Bankruptcy Code to impose restrictions on the ability of a company in bankruptcy to reject
a labor agreement.”) (footnote omitted); Ceccotti, supra note 92, at 416 (discussing how
Congress passed Section 1114 of Bankruptcy Code shortly after passing Section 1113, which
restricts elimination of retiree health, life insurance, and disability benefits when company
files for bankruptcy).
98. See Brannick, supra note 96, at 1583–84 (discussing purpose and impact of Section
1113 of Bankruptcy Code).
99. See Ceccotti, supra note 92, at 416.
Sections 1113 and 1114 represent deliberate policy choices by Congress to restrain
a debtor’s discretion under federal bankruptcy policy by prescribing special
treatment for collective bargaining agreements and retiree insurance obligations not
applicable to executory contracts generally or to other types of monetary
obligations. Balancing these non-bankruptcy interests against federal bankruptcy
policy, Congress determined that labor agreements and retiree health insurance
should be afforded special protections notwithstanding the prerogatives otherwise
available to a debtor in a chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Section 1113 was added to prevent the strategic use of the Bankruptcy Code by
employers seeking to reject labor contracts, and to save employees from bearing
the burden of the employer’s bankruptcy. 100
Despite the best of congressional intentions in enacting Section 1113,
employers have continued to strategically use the bankruptcy courts to avoid
obligations to their employees, including the termination of pension plans
sponsored by the companies. 101 The use of Section 1113 proceedings to avoid
pension obligations gained notoriety in the single employer plan context. 102
More recently, multiemployer pension plan contributors are resorting to the
bankruptcy device to annul their collective bargaining agreements, avoid the
cost of future collectively bargained contributions to the multiemployer plan,
withdraw from the multiemployer plan, and evade EWL. 103 Moreover,
employers gain the advantage of transferring their share of the unfunded
pension liabilities to their business competitors remaining in the plan. 104
When an employer declares bankruptcy, a conflict arises between the
Bankruptcy Code and the MPPAA. 105 Certain provisions in the Bankruptcy
100. See id. at 418 (discussing congressional intention for creating Section 1113); see
also Adventure Res., Inc. v. Holland, 137 F.3d 786, 797–98 (4th Cir. 1998) (explaining that
Congress created Section 1113 to stop use of bankruptcy law as offensive weapon in labor
relations).
101. See Ceccotti, supra note 92, at 417 (explaining that despite addition of Sections
1113 and 1114 of Bankruptcy Code, there has been wave of bankruptcy cases where
employers have used bankruptcy courts strategically as cost-cutting tool). This permits
employers to reject collective bargaining agreements, reduce or eliminate retiree health
obligations, and terminate defined benefit pension plans. See id.; see also id. at 419.
The heavy focus on labor and benefit cost cuts in the ‘transformation’ bankruptcies
offers strong proof that the substantive labor policies incorporated into the
Bankruptcy Code through section 1113 are not operating as Congress intended.
Despite the legislative choice made by Congress to restrain bankruptcy prerogatives
where labor agreements are concerned, debtors have been free to use section 1113
and section 1114 to take broad aim at collective bargaining agreements, pension
plans and retiree benefits.
Id.
102. See Brannick, supra note 96, at 1583–85 (discussing employers’ use of
bankruptcy courts and Section 1113 to avoid pension obligations to single employer pension
plans).
103. See Brannick, supra note 96, at 1585 (“The recent use of Chapter 11 by employers
with large unfunded pension obligations mimics the use of Bildisco and Chapter 11 by
employers with unwanted labor contracts. As it did after Bildisco, Congress must intervene to
prevent the abuse of Chapter 11 by employers seeking to reorganize.”). For a further
discussion of employer contributors using the Bankruptcy Code to avoid obligations, see
supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
104. See Mazo & Lee, supra note 63, at 41 (explaining that every year multiemployer
pension plan trustees determine amount of liability assessed to previously withdrawn
employers that is uncollectible and that amount is allocated among contributing employers).
105. See Kilgannon, supra note 6, at 51 (discussing conflict between MPPAA and
Bankruptcy Code).
The divergent case law is the product of an apparent conflict between the
provisions of MPPAA and the Bankruptcy Code. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code
contemplates the discharge of contingent and claims; MPPAA provides that a
withdrawal liability claim does not ripen unless and until the employer withdraws
from the fund.
Id.
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Code allow for the discharge of contingent and unmatured claims. 106 Under
the MPPAA, a “withdrawal liability claim does not ripen unless and until the
employer withdraws from the fund.” 107 In the bankruptcy context, an
employer’s withdrawal from a multiemployer pension plan can happen either
before they petition for bankruptcy protection (pre-petition) or after they file for
protection (post-petition). 108
When an employer withdraws from the multiemployer pension plan before
the bankruptcy court confirms their plan of reorganization, the EWL assessed to
the employer ripens and may be asserted as a claim against the bankruptcy
estate. 109 The Bankruptcy Code sets forth an order of priority for the payment
of claims against the estate of a debtor. 110 However, neither the Bankruptcy
Code nor ERISA classify EWL. 111 As a result, courts have found that EWL
does not have priority status. 112 The EWL is treated as a general unsecured
claim and the pension fund receives a portion of their claim along with other
unsecured claimants from the bankruptcy estate. 113 The money unsecured
claimants receive is usually a fraction of their claim against the bankruptcy
estate. 114 In exchange for the money, the EWL, and consequently the
employer’s obligation to contribute to the fund, is discharged when the
bankruptcy court confirms the employer’s reorganization plan. 115
Conversely, when an employer has not withdrawn from a multiemployer
pension plan prior to the bankruptcy court’s confirmation of the employer’s
reorganization, they have not yet accrued EWL and it cannot be asserted as a
claim against the bankruptcy estate. 116 Under those circumstances, a debtoremployer may petition the court to allow it to reject any and all collective
106. See id. (explaining that Bankruptcy Code allows for discharge of certain debts).
107. Id.
108. See id. at 52–53 (explaining that timing of employer’s withdrawal from plan is
very important in bankruptcy context, and discussing difference between withdrawal that
occurs before employer files for bankruptcy protection and one that occurs following
bankruptcy plan confirmation).
109. See id. (discussing when EWL ripens as claim and can be asserted against
bankruptcy estate).
110. See Levin, supra note 78, at 13 (describing how claims are prioritized in
bankruptcy proceedings and discussing how withdrawal liability claims are treated in
bankruptcy proceedings).
111. See id. (explaining that EWL is not given priority status by either ERISA or
Bankruptcy Code).
112. See id. (“The status of withdrawal liability claims against an employer which has
filed for bankruptcy protection is not expressly dealt with in either the Bankruptcy Code or
ERISA. However, courts have generally held that a claim for withdrawal liability is not
entitled to priority status as an administrative claim.”).
113. See id. (noting that courts have generally held that claims for withdrawal liability
are not entitled to priority status as administrative claim).
114. See NCCMP Brief, supra note 14, at 12 (“[W]ithdrawal liability treated as a
general unsecured claim on which the plans will be entitled to pennies on the dollar if
anything.”).
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (2006) (stating that bankruptcy court’s confirmation of
reorganization plan discharges all debts arising before confirmation).
116. See Kilgannon, supra note 6, at 51–53 (discussing when claim for EWL can be
brought against bankruptcy estate). For a discussion of when an employer is deemed to have
withdrawn from a multiemployer pension plan, see supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
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bargaining agreements with its employees’ unions and terminate its obligation
to contribute to all multiemployer pension plans. 117 The debtor-employer must
comply with the procedural and substantive requirements of Bankruptcy Code
Section 1113. 118 Bankruptcy courts consider nine elements when considering a
Section 1113 motion. 119 Assuming the employer can make the showings
required by Section 1113, the court can terminate the debtor-employer’s
obligation to contribute to the multiemployer pension plan. 120 The termination
of the debtor-employer’s obligation to contribute to the pension plan constitutes
a withdrawal and may trigger EWL to the plan. 121 The EWL is considered a
general unsecured claim and is dischargeable by the court. 122
117. See Kilgannon, supra note 6, at 51–53 (explaining how EWL is treated in
bankruptcy proceedings).
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2006) (limiting when employers may reject collective
bargaining agreements); see also Ceccotti, supra note 92, at 424–26 (explaining how statute
requires submission of proposal based on reliable information that provides modifications
necessary in order for debtor to reorganize and requires good faith bargaining with unions
following submission of proposal); WILLIAM MILLER COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶
1113.01 (2009) (explaining that Section 1113 incorporates both procedural and substantive
requirements); Jeffrey H. Taub, Audrey Aden Doline & Douglas Mintz, The Devil (Dog)® is
in the Details: Bankruptcy Court Denies Hostess’s Motion to Reject Collective Bargaining
Agreements on Narrow Factual Grounds, JDSUPRA LAW NEWS (June 6, 2012),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-devil-dog-is-in-the-details-ban-15523/ (explaining that
“[c]ourts are split on the meaning of term ‘necessary to permit the reorganization of the
debtor’” and that courts in Second Circuit, where Hostess case is being litigated, “use a more
flexible approach and analyze the effects that an unmodified CBA would have on the debtors
ability to attain financial health”) (citations omitted).
119. See Sharon Levine, S. Jason Teele & Andrew D. Behlmann, An Overview of
Collective Bargaining Agreements, Retiree Medical Benefits, and Pension Issues in Chapter
11, CORNELL UNIV., INDUS. & LABOR RELATIONS SCHOOL (June 21, 2012),
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/law/events/upload/20780364_2_Seminar-Materials-1113-11141.pdf (explaining that courts’ address uniform set of nine elements when deciding Section
1113 motions, and that these factors incorporate procedural and substantive elements of
statute); see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 118, at ¶ 1113.01.
Subsections 1113(b) and (c) set forth the statutory requirements for judicial
approval or rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. These subsections
overlap and commingle the following procedural and substantive requirements: the
debtor in possession or trustee must have made a proposal to the union for changes
to the collective bargaining agreement based on the most complete and reliable
information available at the time of the proposal; the proposed modifications must
be necessary to permit reorganization of the debtor; the proposed modifications
must assure that all affected parties are treated fairly and equitably; the debtor in
possession or trustee must have provided the union with such relevant information
as is necessary to evaluate the proposal, must have met with the collective
bargaining representative at reasonable times subsequent to making the proposal
and must have negotiated in good faith with the union concerning the proposal; the
union must have refused to accept the proposal without good cause; and the balance
of the equities must clearly favor rejection of the agreement.
Id.
120. See Levine et al., supra note 119 (explaining how court may approve rejection if
debtors prove all nine elements).
121. For a discussion of when EWL is triggered, see supra notes 67–70 and
accompanying text.
122. See Levin, supra note 78, at 13 (explaining how courts have generally held that
claim for withdrawal liability is not entitled to priority status as administrative claim and how
courts have held that withdrawal liability is general unsecured claim); see also Kilgannon,
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However, the liability for discharged EWL does not stop with the
employer-debtor. 123 If the employer-debtor is a member of a controlled group
of trades and businesses, any other member of that group that is not part of the
bankruptcy filing may be liable for the EWL of the bankrupt employerdebtor. 124 A discharge of EWL applies only to the bankrupt entity and not to
any other controlled group member. 125
This loophole to withdrawal liability has led to the underfunding of many
multiemployer pension plans. 126 As a result, the other contributing employers
who have continued their obligation to the plans are forced to fill the gaping
hole of unfunded liabilities left behind by withdrawing employers who escape
EWL through bankruptcy. 127 In addition, paying for the unfunded liabilities of
withdrawn employers increases the financial strain on the remaining
contributors to the plan and incentivizes others to withdraw using the
Ultimately, this loophole perpetuates the
bankruptcy escape hatch. 128
downward spiral that Congress meant to prevent with the MPPAA and

supra note 6, at 52–53.
[T]he fund’s withdrawal liability claim would most likely be treated as a general
unsecured claim and the fund would receive a pro rata distribution from a fund that
is created to pay all of the employer’s unsecured creditors. Typically, the payout to
unsecured creditors is a small percentage of the total claim. In consideration for the
distribution, the employer’s obligation to the fund would be eliminated or
‘discharged’ upon confirmation of the employer’s plan of reorganization.
Id.
123. For a discussion of liability beyond the employer debtor, see infra notes 124–25
and accompanying text.
124. See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. SCOFBP, LLC, 668 F.3d 873,
876 (7th Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2688 (2012) (“Under the MPPAA, all trades or
businesses under common control are treated as constituting a single employer for purposes of
determining withdrawal liability. Each trade or business under common control is jointly and
severally liable for any withdrawal liability of any other.”) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In Central States, the court held that two affiliates of a
withdrawing employer who went into bankruptcy were trades or businesses under common
control with insolvent company under MPPAA and, therefore, were liable to the pension plan
for the bankrupt employer’s withdrawal liability. See id. at 882.
125. See Levin, supra note 78, at 14 (discussing scope of EWL).
126. See Nyhan Statement, supra note 17, at 1–3.
If no action is taken, the Fund is projected to be insolvent in the next 10–15
years . . . . While many factors have contributed to the Fund’s problems, the single
largest factor relates to the pension benefits that are paid to retirees of employers no
longer in business (and thus not contributing to the Fund) . . . . When a company in
a multiemployer plan goes out of business without paying its share of the liabilities,
it is the surviving employers in the multiemployer plan that assume the
liabilities. . . . . More than 600 trucking companies that contributed to the Fund
have gone bankrupt since 1980 and many thousands of others have gone out of
business without filing formal bankruptcy . . . .
Id.
127. See NCCMP Brief, supra note 14, at 10 (“As an increasing number of
contributing employers seek to shed contribution and withdrawal liability obligations to
multiemployer plans under Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, fewer employers remain to
contribute to those plans and to fund the plans’ payment of accrued benefits.”).
128. See id. at 9 (explaining that employer withdrawal increases financial pressure on
remaining contributors, which in turn increases incentive on other employers to withdraw
from plan, essentially accelerating vicious downward spiral).
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circumvents the purpose of Section 1113. 129
Section 1113 was meant to protect American workers from bearing a
disproportionate burden of their employer’s bankruptcy. 130 However, the
current situation seems in direct conflict with the purpose of the statute. 131 As
several commentators note, despite the creation of Section 1113, employers
continue to file for bankruptcy at an alarming rate solely for the purpose of
shedding obligations to their employees. 132
V. REVIVING THE DEATH SPIRAL: THE HOSTESS CASE
In January 2012, Hostess Brands, Inc. sought bankruptcy protection and
reorganization. 133 On January 25, 2012, Hostess filed a motion with the
bankruptcy court seeking to reject or modify 296 collective bargaining
agreements with labor unions representing their employees, and to modify
certain retiree obligations pursuant to Sections 1113 and 1114 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 134 A core purpose of the motion was to terminate the
company’s obligation to contribute to all multiemployer pension plans covering
its employees. 135
129. For a discussion of the downward spiral, see supra notes 49–62 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the purpose of Section 1113, see supra notes 97–100
and accompanying text.
130. See Ceccotti, supra note 92, at 418 (explaining that principal purpose of Sections
1113 and 1114 is to “protect employees and retirees from bearing a disproportionate burden of
their employer’s bankruptcy”).
131. See id. at 417 (noting that despite creation of Sections 1113 and 1114, there has
been wave of bankruptcy cases specifically targeting labor costs). As a result, labor groups
have had to absorb losses including elimination of jobs, cuts in wages and benefits,
termination or freezing of pension plans, and reductions in health benefits. See id.
132. See id. at 415 (discussing how recently there has been resurgence in corporate
bankruptcies targeting labor costs, pension funding, and retiree health benefits obligations).
133. See In Re Hostess Brands, Inc., et al., 477 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection); see also David A. Kaplan, Hostess is
MONEY
(July
26,
2012,
5:00
AM),
Bankrupt . . .
Again,
CNN
http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2012/07/26/hostess-twinkies-bankrupt/ (stating that this is
second time in decade that Hostess has filed for bankruptcy).
134. See Memorandum of Law Supporting Mot. of Debtors & Debtors in Possession to
(A) Reject Certain Collective Bargaining Agreements & (B) Modify Certain Retiree Benefit
Obligations, Pursuant to Sections 1113(c) & 1114(g) of the Bankruptcy Code at 1, In re
Hostess Brands, Inc., et al., 477 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2012) (No. 12-22052) [hereinafter
Debtor’s Brief in Support of Motion] (requesting to modify or reject 296 collective bargaining
agreements). See generally Jeffrey H. Taub et al., supra note 119 (explaining Hostess’s
January 25th motion to bankruptcy court and their argument about why Hostess should be
allowed to reject collective bargaining agreements).
135. See Mot. of Debtors and Debtors in Possession to (A) Reject Certain Collective
Bargaining Agreements & (B) Modify Certain Retiree Benefit Obligations, Pursuant to
Sections 1113(c) & 1114(g) of the Bankruptcy Code at ¶ 4, In re Hostess Brands, Inc., et al.,
477 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2012) (No. 12-22052) (stating that debtors sought order to
“reject 296 collective bargaining agreements with Unions and to modify any obligation . . .
that may provide non-pension benefits to retirees formerly represented by the IBT or BCT”)
(footnote omitted); see also id. at ¶ 18 (stating that, if Debtor were to withdraw, they would be
assessed $2 billion in withdrawal liability); Rachel Feintzeig, ConAgra, Pension Funds
ST.
J.
(Feb.
22,
2012),
Oppose
Hostess
Withdrawals,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204909104577237643524650590.html

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015

21

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 6 [2015], Art. 4

78

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 58: p. 57

The motion by Hostess Brands caused outrage among industry members,
pension funds involved in the case, and the National Coordinating Committee
for Multiemployer Plans (NCCMP). 136 The Teamsters Union objected to the
motion, as did a number of the Teamsters’ multiemployer pension plans to
which Hostess was obligated to contribute. 137 The NCCMP, an advocacy
group for multiemployer plans, filed an amicus curiae brief in opposition to the
motion. 138 The unions and pension plans asserted that the protective
procedural and substantive conditions for rejection of the bargaining agreements
under Sections 1113 had not been satisfied by Hostess, and that the court lacked
authority to release the company from its obligations under the agreements. 139
The pension plans also focused on the harm to the plans and their
participants that would be caused by Hostess withdrawing from the plans,
especially if Hostess’s EWL was discharged. 140 They argued that excusing the
company from EWL would “fl[y] in the face of the long standing policy
(“The company has said it can’t survive with its current labor costs and launched a bid to shed
its union deals.”).
136. See Feintzeig, supra note 135 (explaining that Hostess’s motion angered industry
members, pension funds associated with two major unions involved in case, and National
Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans, all of which urged judge to strike down
Hostess’s request).
137. See Objection of Interstate Brands Corp.—Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Nat’l
Negotiating Comm. to the Debtors’ Motion to Reject Collective Bargaining Agreements
Pursuant to Sections 1113 & 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code, In re Hostess Brands, Inc., et al.,
477 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2012) (No. 12-22052) [hereinafter IBC Objection] (objecting
to Hostess’s motion to reject or modify collective bargaining agreements); see also IUOE
Stationary Engineers Local 39, Local 101, Local 286, Local 309, Local 627, & Local 926’s
(IUOE) Objection to & Opposition to Second Mot. of Debtors and Debtors in Possession to
Reject Certain Collective Bargaining Agreements Pursuant to Section 1113(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code at 5–6, In re Hostess Brands, Inc., et al. 477 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2012) (No. 12-22052) (emphasizing devastating financial impact on workers of bankrupt
companies that escape payment of wages and pensions, noting that “unlike sophisticated
commercial creditors, most employees do not meaningfully ‘assume the risk’ of their debtor’s
default . . . and have little ability to protect themselves in advance of an employer’s possible
default.”) (quoting Donald R. Korobkin, Employee Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 5, 6 (Spring 1996)); see also Joint Objection to Mot. of Debtor & Debtors in
Possession to (A) Reject Certain Collective Bargaining Agreements & (B) Modify Certain
Retiree Benefit Obligations, Pursuant to Sections 1113(c) & 1114(g) of the Bankruptcy Code
at 2–3, In re Hostess Brands, Inc., et al., 477 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2012) (No. 12-22052)
[hereinafter Joint Objection] (objecting on behalf of nine multiemployer pension plans
sponsored by affiliates of International Brotherhood of Teamsters).
138. See NCCMP Brief, supra note 14, at 1 (opposing Hostess’s motion to reject or
modify collective bargaining agreements); see also About the NCCMP, NAT’L
COORDINATING
COMM.
FOR
MULTIEMPLOYER
PLANS,
http://www.nccmp.org/about/index.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) (explaining that NCCMP
is non-profit membership organization dedicated exclusively to advocacy and protection of
multiemployer plans, their participants, and their families).
139. See IBC Objection, supra note 137, at 27–51 (asserting that conditions required
by Section 1113 for rejection of collective bargaining agreement had not been met).
140. See Joint Objection, supra note 137, at 17.
Consequently, allowing Hostess Brands to implement the modifications set forth in
the Motion places an unfair economic drain on the MEPPs that will disturb the
actuarial soundness of the Plans and likely lead to the insolvency of some, if not all
of the MEPPs that have filed this Joint Objection.
Id.
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adopted by Congress to promote and foster the maintenance of multiemployer
plans[,]” citing the MPPAA’s findings and policy provision. 141 Calling it a
“matter of national concern,” the NCCMP reinforced the plans’ position by
broadening its perspective and presenting the Hostess case as a serious threat to
the entire multiemployer pension plan system. 142
Significantly, similar objections to the rejection motion were submitted by
many of Hostess’s competitors in the food and snack industries who participate
in many of the affected multiemployer pension plans. 143 These competitors
vociferously argued that allowing Hostess to withdraw from the plans and
escape EWL would give the company unfair competitive advantages relative to
companies that continue to participate in the plans because: Hostess would be
relieved of the cost of regular contributions to the plans; Hostess’s share of the
plans’ unfunded benefit liabilities would be shifted to the remaining employers
and increase their contribution costs; and, these expanded liabilities would
hinder the ability of competing companies to raise investment capital to operate
and expand their businesses. 144 The plans’ unfunded benefit liabilities do not
141. Id. at 20 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006)).
142. See NCCMP Brief, supra note 14, at 4–10.
This is a matter of national concern because it reflects the very concerns that
motivated Congress in adopting ERISA in 1974 and MPPAA in 1980, namely the
need to ensure that employees will receive promised pension benefits by protecting
multiemployer plans from the negative impact of employer withdrawals . . . .
Congress adopted MPPAA to address the ‘vicious downward spiral’ of employers
withdrawing from multiemployer plans and increasing the financial pressure on
remaining contributors which in turn increases the incentive on other employers to
withdraw from the plan and so on . . . . [T]he solution to this downward spiral is
not to permit more employers to exit plans without paying their withdrawal
liability, which is precisely what Debtors seek with their motion. Indeed, the
‘vicious downward spiral’ would be accelerated by the Court’s granting of Debtors’
motion, both because Debtors are themselves a significant employer in the industry
and because of the precedent it sets or the ‘road-map’ it would provide to permit
other employers to ‘shed’. . . their pension obligations in this manner.
Id.
143. See Objection of BBU, Inc. to Mot. of Debtor & Debtors in Possession to (A)
Reject Certain Collective Bargaining Agreements & (B) Modify Certain Retiree Benefit
Obligations, Pursuant to Sections 1113(c) & 1114(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, In re Hostess
Brands, Inc., et al., 477 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12-22052) (objecting to
Hostess’s motion to reject or modify collective bargaining agreements and asking judge to
reject motion); see also Objection by Lewis Bros. Bakeries Inc. & Chicago Baking Co. to
Debtors Mot. to (A) Reject Certain Collective Bargaining Agreements & (B) Modify Certain
Retiree Benefit Obligations Pursuant to Sections 1113(c) & 1114(g) of the Bankruptcy Code,
In re Hostess Brands, Inc., et al., 477 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12-22052)
[hereinafter Lewis Brothers Objection] (objecting to Hostess’s motion in its capacity as
employer-sponsor of many of multiemployer pension plans from which Hostess sought to
withdraw); Perfection Bakeries, Inc.’s Limited Objection to Mot. of Debtors & Debtors in
Possession to (A) Reject Certain Collective Bargaining Agreements & (B) Modify Certain
Retiree Benefit Obligations, Pursuant to Sections 1113(c) & 1114(g) of the Bankruptcy Code,
In re Hostess Brands, Inc., et al., 477 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12-22052)
[hereinafter Perfection Bakeries Objection] (objecting to Hostess’s motion and requesting
judge to strike down Hostess’s motion).
144. See Lewis Brothers Objection, supra note 143, at 4 (claiming that increased
withdrawal liability would harm ability of Lewis Brothers to obtain financing); see also
Perfection Bakeries Objection, supra note 143, at 8 (“Moreover, Debtors’ Proposals do not
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“vanish into thin air,” rather they are redistributed to the remaining
employers. 145 The competitors warned, like the pension plans, that Hostess’s
avoidance of plan liability would trigger a “domino effect” driving even more
bakeries into bankruptcy. 146
On May 14, 2012, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain conducted a
hearing on Hostess’s rejection motion and announced his ruling. 147 After
surveying the law of Section 1113 and the various factors to be considered in
deciding whether to allow rejection of collective bargaining agreements, he
focused on the pension issues. 148 He concluded that Hostess’s participation in
multiemployer pension plans, particularly the plans sponsored by the Teamsters
Union, was a “potentially insurmountable obstacle” to the company emerging
from bankruptcy and that the company’s withdrawal was necessary. 149 He
noted that Hostess had modified its original pension proposal in view of the
Teamsters’ strong opposition to rejoin two financially sound plans for current
employees, but that the Teamsters counter-proposed an arrangement under
which the company would rejoin the same pension plans after discharge of its
EWL by the court. 150 Judge Drain considered the Teamsters’ idea to be
creative but risky, and sided with Hostess. 151 Nevertheless, the Judge

address the Debtors’ windfall gain if Debtors are permitted to evade their MEPP obligations;
not only would Debtors’ cost of doing business decrease substantially, but the cost of doing
business for each of Debtors’ competitors that participate in the MEPPs would increase
dramatically.”); Perfection Bakeries Objection, supra note 143, at 10–12 (explaining how
Hostess would obtain unfair competitive advantage).
145. See ConAgra Foods, Inc.’s Objection to Mot. of Debtors & Debtors in Possession
to (A) Reject Certain Collective Bargaining Agreements & (B) Modify Certain Retiree
Benefit Obligations, Pursuant to Sections 1113(c) & 1114(g) of the Bankruptcy Code at 3, In
re Hostess Brands, Inc., et al., 477 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12-22052)
(explaining that if Debtor’s withdrawal liability is treated as general unsecured claim and not
paid in full, debtor’s financial burden will be redistributed to debtor’s direct competitors who
continue to contribute to multiemployer pension plans).
146. See Perfection Bakeries Objection, supra note 143, at 11–12.
Debtors’ withdrawal from the MEPPS [sic] may further weaken the economic
condition of the MEPPs, thus increasing the unfunded liability and the funding
obligations of the remaining contributing employers . . . . As a result, the
contingent withdrawal liability of each remaining contributing employer to the
MEPPs will increase significantly. The significant ‘aggregate’ adverse impact may
result in the domino effect of more bakeries seeking relief under the Bankruptcy
Code in order to continue to compete on a level playing field in the marketplace.
This outcome would leave MEPPs wholly unfunded, which would have an adverse
impact on thousands of employee beneficiaries of such MEPPs.
Id.
147. See Transcript for May 14, 2012, In Re Hostess Brands, Inc., et al., 477 B.R. 378
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12-22052) (ruling on Hostess’s motion to reject or modify
collective bargaining agreements). For a discussion of Judge Drain’s findings, see infra notes
148–55 and accompanying text.
148. See id. at 114–18 (discussing pension issues involved in Hostess’s bankruptcy
case).
149. See id. at 115–17 (discussing Hostess’s withdrawal from multiemployer pension
plans and concluding that it was necessary).
150. See id. at 116–20 (explaining proposals from both Hostess and Union).
151. See id. (finding Union’s proposals creative and finding that Union negotiated in
good faith).
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expressed concern about the exclusion of new hires under the company’s
proposal, thus denying the motion without prejudice and sending the parties
back to the bargaining table to fine tune the company’s offer before resubmission to the court. 152
Despite all of the objections invoking national pension policy concerns and
the inequitable distribution of pension liabilities, Judge Drain’s decision was
based on a conventional bankruptcy law analysis. 153 He showed little concern
for the national pension policy implications or for the impact on Hostess’s
competitors. 154 He acknowledged that “although . . . it would be painful for the
specific MEPPs that the Debtors must withdraw from, it is in my view
necessary for the Debtors to withdraw from those MEPPs . . . .” 155
A hearing on Hostess’s second rejection motion regarding other unions’
agreements was held on October 3, 2012. 156 Rejecting arguments that the other
unions’ pension plans should be seen in a different light than the Teamsters’
plans, Judge Drain ruled that there would be “across the board treatment” for all
of the multiemployer pension plans; thus, Hostess would be permitted to
withdraw from all of the pension plans without EWL. 157
In the meantime, Hostess reached a settlement with the Teamsters Union
regarding the impact of the company’s restructuring on its members. 158 The
agreement provided that the company would work with Teamsters to provide
for re-entry to the same multiemployer pension plans in the future under certain
detailed conditions. 159 Hostess filed a reorganization plan with the court on
October 10, 2012 which provided with regard to the multiemployer pension

152. See id. at 124 (“The one area that I have a grave concern about with regard to that
proposal is the notion in that proposal that it would include only existing employees and not
future hires.”); see also id. at 130 (“I will deny the motion for the reasons that I have stated. I
would, however, be receptive to a motion that makes a proposal along the lines that I’ve
outlined.”).
153. For a discussion of the policy concerns regarding Hostess’s motion, see supra
notes 137–46 and accompanying text.
154. See Transcript for May 14, 2012, supra note 147, at 117 (dismissing concerns
about Hostess withdrawing from multiemployer pension plans).
155. Id. at 131.
156. See Transcript for Oct. 3, 2012, In Re Hostess Brands, Inc., et al., 477 B.R. 378
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12-22052) (discussing second motion of debtors to reject certain
collective bargaining agreements pursuant to Section 1123(c)).
157. See id. at 266 (finding that differences between IUOE and other unions involved
in Hostess’s bankruptcy did not outweigh need to show all of Hostess’s employees that they
were being treated similarly); see also id. at 267–68 (deciding that risks inherent in IUOE
multiemployer pension plan were same types of risks that led to conclusion during hearing for
original motion to reject IBT’s agreements where it was decided that debtors acted
appropriately in seeking to severely modify agreements as they applied to all MEPPs).
Notably, the judge rejected the argument that bankruptcy proceedings could not absolve
Hostess of its EWL because 29 U.S.C. §1392(c) requires that any transaction whose principal
purpose is to evade or avoid EWL be disregarded in determining EWL. See id. at 263–64.
158. See Letter of Understanding for the Restructuring of Hostess Brands, THE INT’L
BHD.
OF
TEAMSTERS
1
(2012),
http://www.teamster.org/sites/teamster.org/files/82712HostessFinalOffer2012.pdf (explaining
settlement agreement with Hostess).
159. See id. at 3–4 (explaining part of settlement agreement between Hostess and
Union which requires Hostess to re-enter same multiemployer pension plans).
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plans: “To the extent that the Debtors have not previously withdrawn from a
MEPP, the Debtors shall be deemed to have withdrawn from all MEPPs no later
than December 31, 2012.” 160
However, another union that represented many Hostess employees, the
Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers International
Union (Bakery Workers) refused to accept the imposed terms of employment
and, after court-ordered mediation failed to produce an agreement, called a
strike in November 2012. 161 Faced with the strike, Hostess’s management
sought and obtained leave from the court to liquidate the company. 162
Hostess is not the only company who sought to rescind their pension
obligations by declaring bankruptcy. 163 In April 2011, the Philadelphia
Orchestra also declared bankruptcy. 164 At the time of the orchestra’s filing,
they were not insolvent. 165 One commentator noted that in fiscal year 2009 the
orchestra’s endowment was over $129,000,000, which was triple the amount of
liabilities as of their bankruptcy filing date. 166 The orchestra’s main reason for
filing was, admittedly, to eliminate their pension obligations. 167 Similar to the
160. Joint Plan of Reorganization of Debtor & Debtors in Possession at 25, In Re
Hostess Brands, Inc., et al., 477 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12-22052).
161. See Dawn McCarty & Phil Milford, Hostess Judge Approves Wind-Down of
(Nov.
21,
2012,
8:33
PM),
Twinkie
Maker,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-21/hostess-bankruptcy-judge-approves-motion-forwind-down.html (explaining that after last-minute mediation with Bakery workers failed to
resolve contract dispute, Hostess Brands was forced to liquidate); see also Chris Isidore,
Hostess Jobs: ‘Great’ to ‘Not Worth Saving’, CNN MONEY (Nov. 16, 2012, 3:38 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/16/news/companies/hostess-workers/index.html
(describing
extreme pay cuts Bakers union workers would have been forced to endure if they had agreed
to contract demands from Hostess Brands).
162. See Dawn McCarty, David McLaughlin & Phil Milford, Hostess Asks Court to
Approve Demise While U.S. Objects, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 19, 2012, 12:49 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-19/hostess-to-seek-court-approval-toliquidate.html (explaining that after mediated negotiations failed to resolve Bakery workers
strike, Judge Drain approved Hostess’s liquidation plan).
163. For a discussion of the Philadelphia Orchestra’s bankruptcy case, see infra notes
164–71 and accompanying text.
164. See Peter Dobrin, Philadelphia Orchestra Association Exits Bankruptcy,
(July
31,
2012,
10:06
AM),
PHILLY.COM
http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/entertainment/fine_arts/Philadelphia-OrchestraAssociation-exits-bankruptcy.html (stating that Philadelphia Orchestra filed Chapter 11
petition in April 2011).
165. See Ivan Katz, The Philadelphia Orchestra’s Unfortunate Bankruptcy Filing,
HUFF. POST BLOG, (May 1, 2011, 10:21 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ivan-katz-/thephiladelphia-orchestr_b_854539.html (explaining that Philadelphia Orchestra was not
insolvent at time they filed for bankruptcy protection).
166. See id. (explaining that Philadelphia Orchestra was nowhere near insolvent when
they applied for bankruptcy protection).
167. See Daniel J. Wakin & Mary Williams Walsh, Other Orchestras Fear Paying
Price for Philadelphia Pension Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/01/arts/music/philadelphia-orchestra-tries-to-avoid-pensionpayments.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (stating that Philadelphia Orchestra, burdened by tens
of millions of dollars in pension obligations it says it cannot afford, is using bankruptcy court
to avoid paying); see also Daniel J. Wakin, Philadelphia Orchestra Offers Plan to Cut Debt,
TIMES,
May
25,
2012,
at
C2,
available
at
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/arts/music/philadelphia-orchestra-submits-plan-to-
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Hostess case, the move elicited the ire of other orchestras around the country
who feared picking up the cost for the orchestra’s strategic use of bankruptcy to
avoid their responsibilities. 168 With some calling it an “abrogation of
responsibility,” what the orchestra effectively did was transfer its burden to
other orchestras and individual musicians. 169 After the judge approved the
orchestra’s request to withdraw from their multiemployer pension plans, their
withdrawal liability was estimated at $35,000,000. 170 That money will now be
redistributed to other employers in a pension fund that is already struggling. 171
The musicians’ fund that the orchestra withdrew from was recently
required by law to take emergency measures after they lost a substantial amount
of money in the financial turmoil of 2008. 172 Similarly, the largest
multiemployer pension plan from which Hostess is withdrawing is the
Teamsters Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund. 173
That fund, upon which hundreds of thousands of workers depend for retirement
income now and in the future, is already headed for insolvency. 174 The
addition of Hostess’s unfunded liabilities could end up crippling the fund in its
entirety. 175 If either fund becomes insolvent, the PBGC will lack sufficient
resources to guarantee the pensions, even at the low PBGC guarantee level set
by ERISA. 176

bankruptcy-court.html (explaining that Philadelphia Orchestra has admitted that shedding
their pension obligations was main reason they filed for bankruptcy).
168. See Wakin & Walsh, supra note 167 (explaining that Philadelphia Orchestra’s
filing for bankruptcy in effort to rid themselves of pension obligations elicited concern from
other orchestras).
169. See id. (quoting Deborah Borda, President of Los Angeles Philharmonic).
170. See id. (stating that withdrawal liability in Philadelphia Orchestra case was $35
million dollars).
171. See id. (explaining that if Philadelphia Orchestra does not pay its estimated
withdrawal liability, then $35 million must be covered by other contributing employers, and
further stating that musician’s fund was already in precarious state before Philadelphia
Orchestra’s withdrawal).
172. See id. (discussing how musicians’ fund had to take emergency measures as result
of financial turmoil of 2008, including reducing accrual of benefits and requiring larger
contributions from participating employers).
173. See Jacqueline Palank, Union Pension, Health Funds Top Hostess Creditor List,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 2012, 10:27 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2012/01/11/unionpension-health-funds-top-hostess-creditorlist/?mod=WSJBlog&utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter (explaining that union
benefit funds, including health and pensions, account for sixteen of forty top unsecured claims
in Hostess bankruptcy case.) One of those pension funds, Central States, Southeast and
Southwest Areas Pension Plan, owed $11.82 million. See id.
174. See Nyhan Statement, supra note 17, at 1 (warning Congress that Teamsters
Union’s Central States pension fund faces insolvency within ten to fifteen years unless
Congress acts to stabilize fund).
175. See id. (noting that failure to pay withdrawal liabilities leads other employers to
assume such liability, thus increasing contributions from other employers and forcing some of
these employers out of business).
176. See PBGC Reports Record $26 Billion Deficit for 2011, PENSION BENEFIT GUAR.
CORP. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/releases/pr12-06.html (explaining
that agency’s deficit rose to $26 billion in 2011, which is largest deficit in PBGC’s thirtyseven year history); see also George M. Kraw, Four Reforms to Save Multiemployer Plans,
BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY 2 (2010) http://www.kraw.com/pdf/kraw-pension-
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The bankruptcies of Hostess and the Philadelphia Orchestra are not isolated
incidents, but rather recent examples of a trend that is emerging. 177 Many
commentators have noted the wave of strategic bankruptcy cases aimed at
relieving even solvent employers of their pension obligations. 178 One
employer filing for bankruptcy creates an incentive for other contributing
employers to follow the same path. 179 What this trend amounts to is the
reemergence of the death spiral that Congress meant to prevent by passing the
MPPAA and the potential end of multiemployer pension plans. 180
VI. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the Hostess case, the 1980 congressional design to
prevent multiemployer pension plans from falling into a death spiral is being
overpowered by the Bankruptcy Code. 181 One of the nation’s largest
multiemployer plans, the Teamsters Central States Southeast and Southwest
Areas Pension Fund, “faces an unprecedented financial crisis” because many of
its contributing employers have withdrawn through bankruptcy or otherwise
gone out of business without paying their EWL. 182 This fund’s experience is
not unique, as is evident from the motions submitted to Judge Drain. 183
benefits.pdf
[T]he Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s insurance program for
multiemployer plans has insufficient funds to cover insured benefits, even though
the PBGC-guaranteed maximum monthly benefit of $1,320 per participant and
median monthly benefit of $820 are relatively low. PBGC’s multiemployer plan
program has reported a deficit every year since 2003. At the end of fiscal year
2009, the program had assets of $1.46 billion and total liabilities of $2.33 billion.
A reported $2.30 billion of those liabilities represented nonrecoverable future
financial assistance to distressed plans.
Id.; NCCMP Brief, supra note 14, at 4 (describing consequences of permitting other
employers to carry burden of insolvent employer’s withdrawal liability).
177. For a discussion of the strategic trend in bankruptcies, see infra notes 178–80 and
accompanying text.
178. See Ceccotti, supra note 92, at 416–17 (explaining that despite addition of
Sections 1113 and 1114 of Bankruptcy Code, there has been wave of bankruptcy cases where
employers have used bankruptcy courts strategically as cost-cutting tool, allowing them to
reject collective bargaining agreements, reduce or eliminate retiree health obligations, and
terminate defined benefit pension plans); see also Brannick, supra note 96, at 1585 (“The
recent use of Chapter 11 by employers with large unfunded pension obligations mimics the
use of Bildisco and Chapter 11 by employers with unwanted labor contracts. As it did after
Bildisco, Congress must intervene to prevent the abuse of Chapter 11 by employers seeking to
reorganize.”).
179. See NCCMP Brief, supra note 14, at 9 (stating congressional intent in passing
MPPAA).
180. For a discussion of the creation of MPPAA, see supra notes 53–62 and
accompanying text.
181. For a discussion of the Hostess bankruptcy case, see supra notes 133–62, and
accompanying text.
182. See Nyhan Statement, supra note 17, at 1–4 (emphasizing that looming
insolvency of fund was caused by assumption of withdrawal liabilities of insolvent employers
formerly in MEPP).
183. See Christopher E. Condeluci, Multiemployer Pension Plans: Unions and Their
Retirees, Management, and Policymakers Must Share the Burden, BNA PENSION & BENEFITS
DAILY 2, (2011), http://www.venable.com/files/Publication/cc010cf4-5bf8-46de-a770-
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However, his decisions in the Hostess case reveal that the national pension
policy of ERISA and MPPAA do not dilute the objectives of the Bankruptcy
Code. 184
Congress included in the MPPAA some tools for mitigating the impact of
withdrawals by bankrupt employers. 185 The PBGC was directed by Congress
to establish a program for reimbursement of uncollectible EWL. 186 However,
no such program was ever created. 187 The MPPAA also authorized the PBGC
to “partition” “orphaned participants” from a multiemployer plan and assume
liability for the benefits of these participants under certain conditions. 188 The
PBGC could require a partition of a plan if the plan experiences a substantial
loss of employer contributions due to bankruptcy and the plan is likely to
become insolvent unless action is taken. 189 The PBGC has used this partition
power on very few occasions and only with small plans involving a small cost
to the agency. 190
Legislation has been proposed in Congress to enhance the PBGC’s
partition authority and nudge the agency into exercising it. 191 Despite the
strong support of the Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension
Fund, the NCCMP, and others, the bill was not passed after a hearing by a
Senate committee. 192 More recently, Congress has stressed its distaste for the
PBGC’s assumption of pension plan liabilities by repealing the agency’s
longstanding borrowing authority. 193
0123b9eb6c01/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6a3d8d47-5017-41b3-af5d09c4f8714da3/Condeluci_article_in_BNA_72911.pdf (“Over the past two decades, thousands
of companies otherwise participating in and contributing to a multiemployer plan have gone
out of business . . . . In many cases, these companies declared bankruptcy, while others have
simply slipped away into the night, never to be heard from again.”). For a discussion of
multiemployer pension plan objections in the Hostess bankruptcy case, see supra notes 139–
44 and accompanying text.
184. For a discussion of Judge Drain’s decisions in the Hostess bankruptcy case, see
supra notes 149–57 and accompanying text.
185. For a discussion of the tools included by Congress, see supra notes 90, 149–57
and accompanying text.
186. For a discussion of the reimbursement program the PBGC was supposed to create,
see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
187. For a discussion of the reimbursement program the PBGC was supposed to create,
see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
188. See 29 U.S.C. § 1413 (2006) (giving partition power to PGBC and outlining how
PBGC may use partitioning).
189.
See PRIVATE PENSIONS: CHANGES NEEDED TO BETTER PROTECT
MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION BENEFITS, supra note 13, at 26–27 (2010) (defining partitioning
and listing circumstances under which PBGC may order partition).
190. See id. at 27 (explaining that since MPPAA was implemented in 1980, PBGC has
partitioned only two plans).
191. See Create Jobs and Save Benefits Act of 2010, S. 3157, 111th Cong. (2010),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:S.3157: (proposing amendment to
ERISA, expanding PBGC’s partitioning power and requiring agency to act when plan
indicated they were in critical status).
192. See Nyhan Statement, supra note 17, at 1 (supporting Create Jobs and Save
Benefits Act and explaining how it would provide essential relief to Fund, “thereby protecting
the pensions of hundreds of thousands of participants in the Fund, as well as the tens of
thousands of jobs of those Americans employed by businesses that contribute to the Fund”).
193. See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141,
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Bills have been introduced in the current and past two Congresses to adjust
the process and standards under Section 1114 for rejecting collective bargaining
agreements with the intent of better protecting employees and retirees. 194 The
2012 Senate version of the legislation included a provision granting
administrative expense status in bankruptcy proceedings to a limited amount of
EWL. 195 Debts that fall under the administrative expense category are given
high priority under the Bankruptcy Code. 196 None of the bills progressed
beyond referrals to committees. 197
It is imperative for the future of multiemployer pension plans for Congress
to find a way to prevent the reemergence of the death spiral. 198 Although some
126 Stat. 405 (2012) (repealing 29 U.S.C. § 1305(c), which authorized PBGC to borrow up to
$100 million by issuing notes and other obligations); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1302(g)(2) (2006)
(“The receipts and disbursements of the corporation in the discharge of its functions shall be
included in the totals of the budget of the United States Government. The United States is not
liable for any obligation or liability incurred by the corporation.”).
194. See Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2013,
H.R. 100, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS113hr100ih/pdf/BILLS-113hr100ih.pdf; see also Protecting Employees and Retirees in
Business Bankruptcies Act of 2012, H.R. 6117, 112th Cong. (2012); Protecting Employees
and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2012, S. 3381, 112th Cong. (2012).
195. See S. 3381 at § 208 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)). This amendment would add
a provision which states:
[W]ith respect to withdrawal liability owed to a multiemployer pension plan for a
complete or partial withdrawal pursuant to section 4201 of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. [§] 1381) [sic] where such
withdrawal occurs on or after the commencement of the case, an amount equal to
the amount of vested benefits payable from such pension plan that accrued as a
result of employees’ services rendered to the debtor during the period beginning on
the date of commencement of the case and ending on the date of the withdrawal
from the plan.
Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2006) (listing allowed administrative expenses under
Bankruptcy Code).
196. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (2006) (giving administrative expenses allowed under
11 U.S.C. § 503(b) second priority in bankruptcy proceedings).
197. See S. 3381 (112th): Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies
Act of 2012, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3381 (last visited Mar.
15, 2013) (explaining that Bill No. S. 3381 was referred to committee but died); see also H.R.
6117 (112th): Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2012,
GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr6117 (last visited Mar. 15, 2013)
(explaining that Bill No. H.R. 6117 was referred to committee but died and was reintroduced
as H.R. 100 on January 3, 2013).
198. See NCCMP Brief, supra note 14, at 4 (“In the event that the downward spiral . . .
is permitted to continue, there is a real and present risk that the multiemployer plans will
fail.”); see also Kraw, supra note 176, at 1.
[T]he future of [multiemployer pension] plans is bleak unless reforms are made
now to change the governance rules and financial obligations of multiemployer
plans. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (Pub. L. No. 109-280) and more recent
legislative efforts have been insufficient to repair the plans’ deteriorating financial
conditions. Some large multiemployer plans are teetering on the brink of
collapse . . . . Moody’s Investors Service estimated the total unfunded liability of
126 of the nation’s largest multiemployer pension plans exceeded $165 billion in
2008. A 2009 survey by the National Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer
Plans found that 80 percent of the plans reviewed were ‘endangered’ or ‘critical’
underfunded status, which put those plans under increased regulatory constraints.
Meanwhile, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s insurance program for
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commentators have proposed solutions, implementing these solutions requires
congressional action. 199 Congress will have an opportunity to reconsider the
regulatory regime for multiemployer pension plans before December 31, 2014,
when key provisions of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 are scheduled to
“sunset.” 200 In that process, Congress should give serious attention to
harmonizing the competing policies of MPPAA and the Bankruptcy Code with
regard to EWL. 201 If a solution is not found, the death spiral that Congress
intended to prevent through the MPPAA may well engulf the multiemployer
pension system, bankrupt the PBGC, and leave millions of workers without the
pensions they earned over a lifetime of labor. 202

multiemployer plans has insufficient funds to cover insured benefits, even though
the PBGC-guaranteed maximum monthly benefit of $1,320 per participant and
median monthly benefit of $820 are relatively low. PBGC’s multiemployer plan
program has reported a deficit every year since 2003. At the end of fiscal year
2009, the program had assets of $1.46 billion and total liabilities of $2.33 billion.
A reported $2.30 billion of those liabilities represented nonrecoverable future
financial assistance to distressed plans.
Id.
199. See Kraw, supra note 176, at 2–3 (suggesting reforms that could help save
distressed multiemployer pension plans by giving plans, participating employers, and unions
greater flexibility to address their specific needs). Some commentators have suggested that
EWL itself is the problem and should be replaced by a regulatory scheme under which plan
trustees would be empowered to eliminate or cap EWL, reduce vested benefits to adjust to
financial setbacks, undertake a reorganization process similar to a Chapter 11 proceeding if
plan becomes severely distressed, and take other measures to preserve the plan. See id.; see
also Paul M. Secunda, The Forgotten Employee Benefit Crisis: Multiemployer Benefit Plans
on the Brink, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 89–95 (2011) (discussing feasibility of four
proposals advanced by Kraw and whether they would alleviate problems that multiemployer
pension plans face). A labor-management retirement commission was convened by the
NCCMP in 2012 to study the current problems of the multiemployer plan system and develop
proposed solutions for Congress’ consideration. See Assessing the Challenges Facing
Multiemployer Pension Plans, supra note 12, at 5–6 (explaining that NCCMP has convened
“Retirement Security Review Commission” which is “comprised of representatives from over
40 labor and management groups from the industries which rely on multiemployer plans to
provide retirement security to their workers.”). The commission has developed a series of
legislative proposals that would remove statutory obstacles to plans taking self-help actions to
avoid insolvency and restore long-term soundness. These actions include transitioning to new
types of plan design that minimizes or eliminates EWL and adjusts benefits as necessary. See
Conclusions of the NCCMP Retirement Security Review Commission, NAT’L COORDINATING
COMM.
FOR
MULTIEMPLOYER
PLANS
1
(2012),
http://www.nccmp.org/conference/pdfs/Retirement%20Security%20Review%20Commission.
pdf (explaining potential solutions for troubled multiemployer pension plans)
200. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006)
(setting sunset of additional funding rules for plans in endangered and critical status); see also
Assessing the Challenges Facing Multiemployer Pension Plans, supra note 12, at 5 (“The
multiemployer funding provisions of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) will sunset at
the end of 2014.”)
201. For a discussion of the conflicting policies of MPPAA and the Bankruptcy Code,
see supra notes 92–132 and accompanying text.
202. See NCCMP Brief, supra note 14, at 4 (articulating negative impact of requiring
other employers in MEPP to assume withdrawal liability of insolvent employer).
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